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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Current hot topics in arbitration include the role of choice in arbitration, pre-
dispute arbitration agreements, religious arbitration, and debates surrounding the 
constitutionality and efficacy of arbitration under state law.1  While the specific 
                                                          
* Dr. Carli N. Conklin is Associate Professor of Law and Senior Fellow in the Center for the Study 
of Dispute Resolution at the University of Missouri School of Law.  This work benefitted from questions 
and comments received during presentations at Texas A&M School of Law (October 2015) and the 
Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution’s Fall 2015 Symposium, Beyond the FAA: Arbitration Pro-
cedure, Practice, and Policy in Historical Perspective (November 2015).  Portions of this article were 
previously published by the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution.  See CARLI CONKLIN, Arbitra-
tion Practice, Procedure, and Policy in Historical Perspective, in EXPLORATIONS IN DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION SCHOLARSHIP 8-10 (Fall 2015) available at http://law.mis-
souri.edu/csdr/files/2015/02/csdrpublication-15.pdf. 
 1. In Fall 2015, The New York Times published, Beware the Fine Print, a three-part series on hot 
topics in arbitration.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.ny-
times.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html? 
(Part I); Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice 
System’, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/busi-
ness/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html (Part II); Michael Corkery & 
Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov 3, 
2015, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitra-
tion-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html (Part III).  See also Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine (Del. 
Coal. II), 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013) (federal court discussion of state arbitration statute). 
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question of each hot topic is distinct, the public discourse surrounding each question 
reveals some common themes: How should we resolve our disputes?  Should that 
process be public or private?  What law or norms should apply?  Do we have a 
right to initiate litigation or resolve our disputes by way of a trial?  If so, may we 
waive those rights through contractual agreement?  If we may waive those rights, 
is it beneficial for democratic decision-making, the development of law, the parties 
in conflict, or the resolution of a dispute for us to do so?  To what extent should 
arbitration adopt or mirror the procedures of litigation or the administrative func-
tions of the court?  Is arbitration distinct from litigation?  Is arbitration effective, 
efficient, and/or “good”? 
At the heart of each of these hot topics and the debates they engender lies a 
single question: “What is arbitration?”  This question was at the heart of the Third 
Circuit’s analysis in Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine,2 a case in 
which the plaintiff, DelCOG, successfully challenged the constitutionality of Dela-
ware’s newly-created statutory system for arbitration.3  As part of its analysis and 
reasoning, the Third Circuit looked to the history of arbitration.4  Unfortunately, 
that history was incomplete and, as a result, inaccurate.  By taking a broad-brush 
approach to arbitration history, the Third Circuit failed to consider both the diversity 
and complexity of arbitration as it has been practiced across American history.5 
This article seeks to explore that history more in depth by taking a close look 
at the historical procedures, practices, and policies of arbitration in three states: 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.  Each state developed a complex system 
of arbitration that included multiple arbitration procedures drawn from English law.  
Each state had unique geographic, political, social, religious, or commercial condi-
tions that influenced not only the development of arbitration in that state, but also 
arbitration practice and the policy goals surrounding its use.  A closer look at arbi-
tration in early America reveals that, rather than one history of American arbitra-
tion, we have many histories.  Considering these varied histories provides us not 
only with a more complete picture of the diversity and complexity of arbitration in 
early America, but also  with new insights as we—disputants, lawyers, judges, leg-
islators, arbitrators, and policy advocates—debate hot topics in arbitration, today. 
Part II will provide an overview of the Third Circuit’s incomplete use of the 
history of arbitration to support its holding in Delaware Coalition for Open Gov-
ernment v. Strine,6 with a specific emphasis on the problems present in the Court’s 
historical analysis.  Part III will kick off a broader, and more complete, history of 
American arbitration by exploring the three types of arbitration available in the Eng-
lish legal tradition.  Part IV will explain how those three types of English arbitration 
                                                          
 2. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 512, 521. 
 3. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine (Del. Coal. I), 894 F.Supp.2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012). 
 4. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 512, 521. 
5.  See Carli N. Conklin, Arbitration Practice, Procedure, and Policy in Historical Perspective, in 
EXPLORATIONS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SCHOLARSHIP 8-10 (Fall 2015) available at http://law.mis-
souri.edu/csdr/files/2015/02/csdrpublication-15.pdf (providing a discussion of where the court went 
wrong, including the court’s discussion of privacy, connections between arbitration and the courts, and 
the extrajudicial nature of arbitration). See Thomas. J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Tri-
fecta, or Closed Door Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
& L. 349 (2012-2013) (providing a discussion arguing that the court got it right); David W. Brown, 
Note, Let Me In: The Right of Access to Business Disputes Conducted in State Courts, 2015 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 207 (same). 
6.  Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 510. 
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were adopted by, and adapted to, the mainland British colonies in North America 
and new American states.  Part IV also will also highlight the complexity and di-
versity of arbitration in American history through a discussion of themes common 
across several states, as well as developments in arbitration procedure, practice, and 
policy that were distinct within individual states.  Finally, Part V will discuss the 
implications of the broader histories outlined in Parts III and IV, with an emphasis 
on why that history matters for future law and policy debates on arbitration. 
II.  THE DELAWARE BACKDROP (AND WHY IT MATTERS) 
The state of Delaware recently passed a statute that allowed its Chancery Court 
judges to conduct arbitrations, at the request of the parties, for businesses in conflict, 
where the disputed amount was in excess of $1 million dollars.7  The arbitration 
proceedings were private.8 
The non-profit organization Delaware Coalition for Open Government 
(DelCOG) initiated litigation, declaring, among other things, that the arbitration 
statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment.9  Specifically, DelCOG 
argued that the private nature of the Chancery Court arbitration proceedings vio-
lated the public’s First Amendment right to open access to proceedings in court.10 
In the case that ensued, Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine,11 
the District Court entered a judgment on the pleadings for DelCOG, holding that 
the Chancery Court arbitration proceeding “functions essentially as a non-jury trial 
before a Chancery Court judge.  Because it is a civil trial, there is a qualified right 
of access and this proceeding must be open to the public.”12  The District Court’s 
analysis here is unusual.  Instead of utilizing the two-prong “experience and logic” 
test to determine a question of open access, the District Court simply determined 
that the arbitration system was comparable to a civil trial and, therefore, must be 
open to the public. 
The Chancery Court judges, including Strine, appealed the District Court’s de-
cision and, in 2013, the Third Circuit affirmed.13  However, the Third Circuit disa-
greed with the District Court’s dismissal of the experience and logic test14—and it 
is here that history comes in to play—summarizing the test, as “[a] proceeding qual-
ifies for the First Amendment right of public access when “there has been a tra-
dition of accessibility” to that kind of proceeding, and when “access plays a 
significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in ques-
tion.”  15                                                           
 7. Id. at 512. 
8.  Id. at 512. 
 9. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine (Del. Coal. I), 894 F.Supp.2d 493, 494 (D. Del. 2012). 
 10. Id. at 494. 
 11. Id. at 493. 
 12. Id. at 494 (emphasis added). 
 13. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 510. 
 14. Id. at 514-15. 
 15. Id. at 514 (emphasis added).  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside 
Co., 478 U.S. 1, 10, 8 (1986). The examination of the history and functioning of a proceeding has come 
to be known as “the experience and logic test.”  See, e.g., U.S. v. Simone, 14 F.3d. 833, 838 (3d Cir. 
1994). In order to qualify for public access, both experience and logic must counsel in favor of opening 
the proceeding to the public.  See N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d. 198, 213-14 (3d Cir. 
2002). Once a presumption of public access is established it may only be overridden by a compelling 
public interest. Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 9. 
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The Third Circuit then applied the experience and logic test to the issues at 
hand, summarizing its decision as follows: 
This appeal requires us to decide whether the public has a right of access 
under the First Amendment to Delaware’s state-sponsored arbitration pro-
gram . . . .  Because there has been a tradition of accessibility to pro-
ceedings like Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration [experi-
ence prong], and because access plays an important role in such pro-
ceedings [logic prong], we find that there is a First Amendment right of 
access to Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitrations.16 
The Chancery Court judges filed cert, which the U.S. Supreme Court denied in 
2014.17 
The Third Circuit was correct in utilizing the experience and logic test to ad-
dress the public access question.  The Third Circuit was correct, also, in considering 
the history of arbitration in its analysis of the “experience” prong of that test.   
Where the Third Circuit went astray was in failing to consider the diversity and 
complexity of arbitration as it has been practiced across American history.  A more 
complete history of arbitration would have provided a very different backdrop for 
the Court’s analysis under the “experience” prong.  Since the “experience” prong 
then informed the Court’s analysis under the “logic” prong, a more complete history 
of arbitration may have led to a different outcome by the Third Circuit altogether.  
The discussion below provides three examples of the diversity and complexity of 
arbitration that were not included in the Court’s overview of arbitration history. 
First, the Third Circuit held that arbitration traditionally has been open to the 
public.18 
In contrast to the Court’s holding, arbitration in America historically has 
been a private proceeding.19  Arbitration has been open to the public only 
through publication of the award as a judgment of the court or the creation 
of a public record on appeal.  In either scenario, publication occurred only 
through the advance choice of one or both parties.20  These procedural re-
alities are mirrored in policy, as the ability to resolve disputes in private 
has been traditionally (but not uniformly) heralded as one of the greatest 
benefits of arbitration as a dispute resolution proceeding.21 
                                                          
 16. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 512, 521 (emphasis added). 
 17. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, 134 S.Ct. 1551 (2014). 
 18. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 521. 
 19. Jerold Auerbach details the New York Chamber of Commerce’s use of arbitration for the settle-
ment of merchant disputes in 1768 specifically due to the private nature of arbitration: “Merchants pre-
ferred informed business experts, sympathetic to commercial imperatives, to inscrutable judges or igno-
rant juries. Disputes not only disrupted business but, when litigated in public, invited the intrusion of 
outsiders into private business practices. . . .”  JEROLD AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW 33, 49 
(1983).  According to Auerbach, the colony of New Haven also promoted arbitration as a private dispute 
resolution model.  Id. at 27-28. 
 20. See infra Part III.B Reference by Rule of the Court, Part III.C. Statutory Arbitration, and Part 
IV.B. Distinct Developments (providing examples of publication by parties choosing to appeal the award 
or to have the award published as an order of the court). 
 21. AUERBACH, supra note 19, at 33. 
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Second, the Third Circuit relied heavily on the connections between Dela-
ware’s arbitration system and the Chancery Court, concluding that the connections 
between the two resulted in a system that looked more like a civil trial than arbitra-
tion.22  Yet, what the Third Circuit failed to articulate was that arbitration tradition-
ally was very well-connected to the courts, often adopting court practices to further 
arbitration goals.  So, for example, in early America, judges were not prohibited 
from sitting as arbitrators, although a judge was discouraged from sitting as an ar-
bitrator for a dispute that had been referred to arbitration in the midst of a case that 
the judge had presided over in litigation.23  Early American state legislatures passed 
statutes that specifically provided for the payment of arbitrators, and associated 
court costs and fees, along the same lines as payment for court costs and fees in 
civil litigation.24  Additionally, some arbitration awards could be entered as an order 
of the court, the same as a judgment in litigation, and clerks were paid to file ei-
ther.25  Once the award was made an order of the court, it was enforceable by the 
contempt power, just like a court judgment in litigation.26  Finally, arbitrators, like 
Chancery Court judges, traditionally held a greater freedom to admit evidence and 
to determine the issues at hand under law or equity.27  Yet, historically, not one of 
these similarities, nor all of them combined, transformed an arbitration proceeding 
into a civil trial.  In contrast to the Third Circuit’s analysis, the two dispute resolu-
tion systems remained distinct. 
Third, history came into play in the terminology utilized by the parties to de-
scribe arbitration place and process.  “Extrajudicial” is a term broadly meaning 
“outside of court.”28  DelCOG adopted the term “extrajudicial” to describe the his-
torical practice and procedure of arbitration, but defined that term quite narrowly, 
                                                          
 22. Del. Coal. II, 733 F.3d at 518. 
 23. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended: The Role of Extrajudicial Dispute Resolution in Ante-
bellum Kentucky and New Jersey, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 39, 60, n.133 (2006).  Disputants’ autonomy 
regarding choice of arbitrator(s) seemed to stem from a strong deference to the disputants’ decision to 
select arbitration to resolve their dispute.  See also Galloway’s Heirs v. Webb, 3 Ky. 326 (Ct. App. 1808) 
(exemplifying a broader example of a court upholding the disputants’ choice of arbitrators, where the 
disputants’ ability to select their own arbitrator extended even to their decision to have the judges in the 
case act as arbitrators). See Ewing v. Beauchamp, 6 Ky. 41, 45 (Ct. App. 1813) (disputants’ choice in 
selecting arbitrators). 
 24. See Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 49, 83-84 (discussing fee provi-
sions in Kentucky and New Jersey). See An Act for Establishing and Regulating the Fees of the Several 
Officers and Other Persons Hereafter Mentioned, 1782 MASS. ACTS 10-15, http://ar-
chives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/103986 (last visited March 4, 2016) (providing Massachusetts’s fee 
provisions). 
 25. See infra Part II.B Reference by Rule of Court, Part II.C Statutory Arbitration (providing discus-
sion of entrance of the award as an order of the court); supra text accompanying note (discussing fee 
schedules). 
 26. See infra Part II.B Reference by Rule of Court, Part II.C Statutory Arbitration (providing discus-
sion of enforceability under the contempt power). 
 27. Smith v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 16 Gray 521, 523 (Mass. 1860).  See Conklin, Transformed, Not Trans-
cended, supra note 23, at 49, 50-52, 84-85 (for New Jersey and Kentucky).  The version of Kentucky’s 
arbitration statute contained in the Revised Statutes of 1852 states that arbitrators “shall take an oath to 
decide the controversy to them submitted according to law and evidence and the equity of the case, to 
the best of their judgment, without favor or affection.” See C.A. WICKLIFFE ET AL., REVISED STATUTES 
OF KENTUCKY: APPROVED AND ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1851 AND 1852. IN FORCE 
FROM JULY 1, 1852 129-130 (1852). 
 28. WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 686 (1996) (defining “extrajudicial” as “out-
side of judicial proceedings; beyond the action or authority of a court”). 
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arguing that the definition of “extrajudicial” was akin to something more like “out-
side of the courthouse.”29  Such a narrow definition runs contrary to the diversity of 
arbitration proceedings across American history.  Early America saw three types of 
arbitration proceedings: Common Law Arbitration, Reference by Rule of the Court, 
and Statutory Arbitration.30  As discussed in Part III, the distinctions between the 
three primarily lie in the timing of the submission to arbitration, the relationship of 
the submission to litigation, and enforcement of the award.31  Formality or infor-
mality of the process also played a role, with Common Law Arbitration providing 
disputants with the greatest flexibility in crafting the arbitration procedure.32  When 
considering the extrajudicial nature of arbitration in early America, these distinc-
tions matter.  It was not the connection to court (such as through submission or 
enforcement) or even the relationship (or lack thereof) to civil litigation that deter-
mined whether or not a dispute resolution proceeding fit the definition of arbitration.  
It was something else, altogether. 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. 
Strine and the U.S. Supreme Court’s later denial of cert were met with some surprise 
among dispute resolution scholars and practitioners.33  Part of that surprise hinged 
on what historically has been seen as a key distinction of arbitration, which, in con-
trast to the Court’s understanding, is the privacy of the arbitration proceeding.   In 
addition, the Court lacked a robust discussion of the variety and diversity of arbi-
tration proceedings—and the relationship of those proceedings to courts and civil 
litigation—across American history. 
III.  ENGLISH ARBITRATION: A COMMON HERITAGE34 
The English legal tradition included three different types of arbitration, which 
early Americans, somewhat inaccurately, labeled Common Law Arbitration, Ref-
erence by Rule of the Court, and Statutory Arbitration.35  As will be discussed in                                                           
 29. See infra Part III.B Reference by Rule of the Court, Part III.C. Statutory Arbitration (discussing 
arbitration as an extrajudicial dispute resolution proceeding that was outside of court (civil or criminal 
trial) but still heavily connected to the courthouse, especially through Reference by rule of the Court and 
Statutory Arbitration).  See generally Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23 (providing 
a specific discussion of arbitration as extrajudicial in early America). 
 30. See infra Part IV.A, Parts IV.B.1-3 (providing a discussion of each of these three types of arbitra-
tion in antebellum, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, generally (IV.A) and respectively 
(IV.B.1, IV.B.2, IV.B.3)). 
 31. See infra Part III English Arbitration. 
 32. Smith, 16 Gray at 523. 
 33. I observed these reactions when the Supreme Court’s denial of cert was announced to a mixed 
crowd of scholars and practitioners during a session on arbitration at the American Bar Association 
Section on Dispute Resolution’s annual conference in April 2014. 
 34. The mainland colonies in British North America and new American states looked to English law 
as handed down through custom or as summarized in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of Eng-
land (1765-1769), which remained the most popular legal text in the United States through the antebel-
lum period.  See JULIUS S. WATERMAN, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries, in ESSAYS 
IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 451-457 (David Flaherty ed., 1969) (discussing the popu-
larity of Blackstone’s Commentaries). 
 35. In the English tradition, these three types of arbitration seem to more commonly be labeled arbi-
tration, reference (including reference by rule of the court or reference by order of the court), and arbi-
tration under the Locke statute. It is not clear from the early American cases if the terms reference by 
rule of the court and reference by order of the court were used synonymously in early America or if the 
terms were used to distinguish cases submitted to arbitration after litigation had commenced, as permit-
ted by court rules (reference by rule of the court) from cases or parts of cases that were submitted to 
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Part IV, the mainland British colonies in North America adopted English-style ar-
bitration and, following the American Revolution, each type of arbitration was prev-
alent throughout the new United States.  Part III provides an overview of these three 
types of arbitration, taking care to highlight both their similarities and their differ-
ences. 
A. Arbitration 
Early Americans regularly discussed arbitration as a creature of the Common 
Law, and in so doing they seem to be (somewhat inaccurately) referring not only to 
the Common Law, but also to arbitration as it had existed in English custom from 
the Anglo-Saxon period forward.  A 1684 English Dictionary defined an arbitrator 
as “an extraordinary Judge in one or more Causes between party and party, chosen 
by their mutual consents . . . .”36  The decision of the arbitrators was called an award 
and was to include the following: “1.  Matter of Controversie [sic].  2.  Submission.  
3. Parties to the submission.  4.  Arbitrators and 5.  Giving up of the Arbitrement 
[award].”37 
William Blackstone similarly defined arbitration in his Commentaries on the 
Laws of England (1765-1769): 
Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters in 
dispute, concerning any personal chattels or personal wrongs, to the judg-
ment of two or more arbitrators; who are to decide the controversy: and if 
they do not agree, it is usual to add, that another person be called in as 
umpire, (imperator) to whose sole judgment it is then referred: or fre-
quently there is only one arbitrator originally appointed.  This decision, in 
any of these cases, is called an award.  And thereby the question is as fully 
determined, and the right transferred or settled, as it could have been by 
the agreement of the parties of the judgment of the court of justice . . . .38 
A key element of Common Law Arbitration was the timing of the submission, 
which was prior to the filing of any action in court.39  According to Blackstone, 
disputants originally submitted their dispute to arbitration either orally or in writing, 
although it had become increasingly common for the disputants to enter into arbi-
tration bonds that would require the parties to stand by the arbitration award.40  A 
second key element of Common Law Arbitration was enforcement: If either party 
                                                          
arbitration by court order with party agreement (reference by order of the court).  This article will use 
the phrase reference by rule of the court, as it was the phrase most commonly used in these three states 
to discuss cases submitted to arbitration after litigation had already commenced. 
 36. JOHN COWEL, NOMOTHETES, THE INTERPRETER 17 (1684) (“arbitrator”). 
 37. Id. (“arbitrement”). 
 38. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 16–17 (1768).  Blackstone includes the definition of 
arbitration in Volume III (“Of Private Wrongs”), Chapter I (Of the Redress of Private Wrongs by the 
Mere Act of the Parties), Part II (Arbitration) of his Commentaries. Blackstone’s definition of arbitration 
is similar to Richard Burn’s. RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 45–51 (1792).  See also Mass. 
Referee Act of 1786 (showing the similarities between the forms outlined in Burn’s A NEW LAW 
DICTIONARY and the forms outlined in the statute). As stated previously, among law books consulted in 
early America, Blackstone’s was the most popular. See WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 451-457. 
 39. BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 16. 
 40. See id. (discussing submission “by word, or by deed”). 
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refused to uphold the arbitration award, the other party would need to bring a breach 
of contract action in court to enforce the arbitration bond.41 
Arbitration was favored in English law, and its common law requirements were 
not many.42  Disputants could submit their dispute to one, two, or three arbitrators.43  
Arbitrators could make determinations on issues of fact and issues of law.44  Arbi-
trators could decide all matters in controversy between the disputants, although mat-
ters of real estate and criminal matters traditionally had been excluded.45  In issuing 
the award, the arbitrators were limited to determining only the causes submitted to 
them; matters outside of submission would be voided, but the remainder of the 
award would stand.46  Awards had to be both “possible and lawful;” arbitrators were 
not required to apply the law, but they could not contradict it.47  The award itself 
was to be “certain and final” and arbitrators could not “reserve any thing [sic] for 
their future judgment, when the time allowed [for issuing an award] is expired.”48  
If two arbitrators could not agree between themselves, they were to appoint an um-
pire, and the authority of the two arbitrators would cease on that point.49 
Courts generally were required to uphold awards “according to the intent of the 
arbitrators” and were prohibited from overturning awards “unless there was corrup-
tion in the arbitrators.”50  Court deference to the arbitration award was tied directly 
to the parties’ decision to select arbitration for the settling of their dispute: “for the 
arbitrators being persons of the parties[’] own choosing, the law presumes that they 
would choose persons whose understanding and judgment they could rely on.”51 
B. Reference by Rule of the Court  
English law recognized a second type of arbitration, known as Reference and 
most often described in early America as Reference by Rule of the Court.52  In Ref-
erence by Rule of the Court, parties to a litigated dispute chose to “refer” their dis-
pute to arbitration, sometimes at the recommendation of the judge overseeing the 
                                                          
 41. See Eben Moglen, Commercial Arbitration in the Eighteenth Century: Searching for the Trans-
formation of American Law, 93 YALE L.J. 135, 139-140 (1983-1984) (providing a discussion of arbitra-
tion bonds). 
 42. The list above contains key provisions.  See Arbitration, RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW 
DICTIONARY 45-51 (more complete listing and discussion).  Bryan A. Garner, editor of Black’s Law 
Dictionary, claims that Burn’s dictionary “appeared during the formative years of American law, and it 
is a valuable reference for those who want to see how legal terms were understood in the 18th century.”  
RICHARD BURN, Introduction to A NEW LAW DICTIONARY, at i (2003) (1792). 
 43. Blackstone for 1 and 2; over time, the umpire option coincided with an original submission to 3 
arbitrators, instead.  BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 16. 
 44. BURN, supra note 38, at 45 (describing issues of law as “a right in things and actions personal and 
uncertain”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 46. 
 47. Id. at 47. 
 48. Id. 
 49. RICHARD BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 47 (1792) (arbitration).  Although Burn seems clear 
on this point, the case law demonstrates that, at times, the final award was issued by the umpire alone, 
and at other times the final award was issued by the initial two arbitrators and the umpire together. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. As discussed previously, some sources refer to this type of reference by the term “Reference by 
Order of the Court” and thereby distinguish it from statutory reference, which is then described as “Ref-
erence by Rule of the Court.” WATERMAN, supra note 34, at 451-457. 
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litigation.53  Historically speaking, the law utilized different terminology (arbitra-
tion, arbitrators, and award for pre-litigation submissions to arbitration; reference, 
referees, and reports for cases submitted to arbitration after litigation had com-
menced) to highlight the differences in the timing of the submission.54  In contrast 
to Common Law Arbitration, disputants who utilized Reference by Rule of the 
Court were not required to file a separate action seeking enforcement if one dispu-
tant failed to abide by the award.55  Instead, the report was filed as a judgment of 
the court and enforced through the contempt power of the court.56  This enforcea-
bility marked one of the greatest benefits of Reference by Rule of the Court and 
prompted the creation of a third type of arbitration, through the Arbitration Act of 
1698.57 
C. Statutory Arbitration   
Statutory Arbitration is perhaps the most interesting of the three forms of arbi-
tration.  In 1697, England undermined the enforcement of Common Law Arbitra-
tion awards by eliminating the penalties that could be assessed to disputants who 
did not comply with the award.58  This change had the potential of undermining 
parties’ compliance with Common Law Arbitration awards and, as a result, dispu-
tants’ willingness to submit their disputes to Common Law Arbitration.  In re-
sponse, Parliament passed the Arbitration Act of 1698, commonly known as the 
Locke statute.59  Under the 1698 Arbitration Act, disputants who wished to submit 
their dispute to arbitration could do so by registering with the court, without first 
commencing any of the steps of litigation.  The arbitration award would be returned 
and made a judgment of the court.60  It then could be enforced through the court’s 
contempt power.61 
Thus, the 1698 Arbitration Act combined the benefits of Common Law Arbi-
tration and Reference by Rule of the Court: Disputants could reap the enforcement 
power previously available only through Reference by Rule of the Court but could 
do so alongside one of the main benefits of Common Law Arbitration, which was 
the ability to resort to arbitration without the time and expense that would occur if 
they were required first to commence litigation.  This new form of arbitration was 
defined in A NEW LAW DICTIONARY (1792) as follows: 
There may also be a submission by rule of court, which is in pursuance of 
the statute 9 & 10 W. c. 15. [the 1698 Arbitration Act] Whereby the parties                                                           
 53. Fairchild v. Adams, 65 Mass. 549, 550, 553 (1853). 
 54. See 1 GILES JACOB, THE NEW LAW DICTIONARY: EXPLAINING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND 
PRESENT STATE OF THE ENGLISH LAW 187-206 (1811); Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th 
Ed. 2009); Reference, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 55. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 68 (citing Overly’s Executor v. 
Overly’s Devisees, 58 Ky. 117, 120-22 (1858)) (providing an example of the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals’ discussion of the enforcement problem that existed with Common Law Arbitration). 
 56. These procedural steps were carried over to the early American tradition. 
 57. See James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The Early History, 31 LAW & HIST. 
REV. 241, 346 (2013) (discussing the benefits of enforcement without first commencing litigation and 
history of both English Arbitration Act of 1698 and its counterparts in the new American states). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 246. 
 60. Id. at 247. 
 61. Id. at 246. 
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may agree that their submission be made a rule of such of his majesty’s 
courts of record as the parties shall chuse [sic]; which court will thereupon 
carry the award into execution in the same manner as for contempt of a 
rule of court.62 
The mainland colonies of British North America (and the new American states) 
adopted English arbitration procedures, but adapted those procedures to local cir-
cumstances.  Such “localization” of the law was permissible so long as colonial law 
only diverged from, and was not repugnant to, the Common Law.63  In other words, 
colonial law was required to uphold the same principles as the Common Law, but 
could differ in its particular provisions and applications.  Colonial law provided the 
legal infrastructure for each of the new American states, with states commonly in-
cluding in their constitutions a statement regarding the scope and reach of English 
Common Law and Acts of Parliament in that state following the American Revolu-
tion.64  Included in that law was English-style arbitration.65 
Part IV looks to the histories of Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts to 
explore the adoption, and adaptation, of English-style arbitration to the colonies and 
new American states.  Part A provides an overview of common themes in the de-
velopment of arbitration procedures in Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.  
Part B then looks to the ways in which the unique circumstances of each state led 
                                                          
 62. BURN, supra note 42, at 46 (arbitration). 
 63. MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004) (detailing this policy by 
which colonial law could diverge from, but not be repugnant to, the Common Law).  It may be that all 
colonies and territories that became new American states in the antebellum period, when Blackstone’s 
Commentaries was at its height, developed arbitration based on the English models.  This article looks 
only at Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts.  See Oldham & Kim, supra note 57, at 241 passim 
(tracking a similar development in Connecticut and Maryland).   Morton Horwitz highlights the devel-
opment of arbitration in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and New York.  MORTON 
HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860 (1977).  See also BRUCE MANN, 
NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS (2001) (Connecticut); AUERBACH, supra note 18 (early America, gener-
ally). 
 64. The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 stated, “That the common law of England, as well as so 
much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until 
they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the 
rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain 
confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”  Section XXII, THE N.J. CONST. 
of 1776 available at http://www.state.nj.us/njfacts/njdoc10a.htm.  The Constitution or Form of Govern-
ment for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780) included a statement of law in Chapter VI, Article 
VII: “All the laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved in the Province, Colony, or 
State of Massachusetts Bay, and usually practised on in the courts of law, shall still remain and be in full 
force, until altered or repealed by the legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights 
and liberties contained in this constitution.” FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS, VOL. III KENTUCKY-MASSACHUSETTS (1909) [hereinafter KY-MASS. CONSTS.] avail-
able at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2676.  The Kentucky Constitution of 1792 stated in Article VIII, 
Section 6, that “All laws now in force in the State of Virginia, not inconsistent with this constitution, 
which are of a general nature, and not local to the eastern part of that State, shall be in force in this State, 
until they shall be altered or repealed by the legislature.”  Id.  The Kentucky Constitution of 1799 pre-
served this provision in Article VI, Section 8.  Id.  Although such a statement would seem to include the 
common law, Virginia did not include a continuance of the common law in its 1776 constitution.  
FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, VOL. VII VIRGINIA-WYOMING-
INDEX (1909) available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/thorpe-the-federal-and-state-constitutions-vol-
vii-virginia-wyoming-index. 
 65. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 16-17 (discussing arbitration as part of the Common Law of 
England). 
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss1/7
No. 1] Arbitration in Early America 65 
to distinct developments in arbitration practices and policies throughout the ante-
bellum period. 
IV.  ARBITRATION IN EARLY AMERICA: ADOPTION AND ADAPTATION 
A. Common Themes 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts each adopted English-style Com-
mon Law Arbitration and Reference by Rule of the Court in the colonial or early 
American periods.66   In the 20 years following the American Revolution, each of 
these states also passed its own version of the Locke statute.67  And from 1780-
1860, legislators, judges, and policy advocates in each of these three states articu-
lated a variety of reasons to favor arbitration as a matter of public policy, with the 
most common arguments in favor of arbitration including savings in time and 
money, and arbitration’s ability to achieve justice.68 
One of the most interesting trends that emerges within these three states—and 
a trend that is important to recognize for the discussion below—is the widespread 
confusion that existed in regards to terminology.  In early America, arbitration was 
referred to by a wide variety of names, including arbitration, common law arbitra-
tion, customary arbitration, arbitration in pais, reference, reference by rule of the 
court, reference by order of the court, statutory arbitration, statutory reference, ar-
bitration by statute, and even appraisal.  The terms arbitration and common law 
arbitration frequently encompassed both English-style Common Law Arbitration 
and Reference by Rule of the Court.  Similarly, the term Reference sometimes was 
used to describe English-style Reference by Rule of the Court and both Statutory 
and Common Law Arbitration.  The terms customary arbitration and arbitration in 
pais usually, but not always, referred to English-style Common Law Arbitration.  
Reference by Rule of the Court and Reference by Order of the Court could refer to 
English-style Reference by Rule of the Court or English-style Statutory Arbitration. 
Perhaps the greatest consistency in early American arbitration terminology is 
its inconsistency.  But while the procedural differences between arbitration, refer-
ence, and statutory arbitration were real—and held great practical consequences for 
the disputants69—the inconsistencies in terminology seemed to have had little prac-
tical effect.  Early Americans commonly used “arbitration” as a short-hand way to 
refer to one or more of these three arbitration procedures, while remaining aware of 
                                                          
 66. See Schooley v. Thorne, 1 N.J.L. 83 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791) (New Jersey); Baker’s Heirs v. Crockett, 
3 Ky. 396, 410-11 (Ct. App. 1808) (Kentucky).  See also Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra 
note 23 (discussing all three types of arbitration in Kentucky and New Jersey); Carli N. Conklin, Lost 
Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson, and Dispute Resolution in Early America, 28 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 581 (2013) [hereinafter Lost Options] (discussing all three types of arbitra-
tion in Massachusetts). See infra Parts IV.B.1 (Kentucky), IV.B.2 (New Jersey), IV.B.3 (Massachusetts). 
 67. Kentucky in 1795. New Jersey in 1794. Massachusetts in 1786.  See infra Part IV.B.1 (Kentucky), 
Part IV.B.2 (New Jersey), Part IV.B.3 (Massachusetts). 
 68. The benefits to be realized through arbitration’s speed, cost savings, and ability to secure justice 
can be found in antebellum policy debates, statutory language, and case law discussions of arbitration in 
all three states. See infra Part IV.B.1 (Kentucky), Part IV.B.2 (New Jersey), Part IV.B.3 (Massachusetts). 
 69. For example, a disputant who took part in Statutory Arbitration and then challenged the validity 
of the award due to flaws in the arbitration procedure would have his claim analyzed in light of the 
particular procedural requirements listed in the statute, instead of the lesser and much more flexible 
procedural requirements of arbitration under the Common Law.  Monosiet v. Post, 4 Mass. 532 (1808). 
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the differences in the arbitration procedures available to them.70  Similarly, the 
states’ highest courts often used the term “arbitration” to encompass all three types 
of arbitration procedures, but were careful to mark procedural differences—includ-
ing timing of the submission, the arbitration process, and enforcement of the 
award—as needed in the specific cases that came before them.71  State courts 
showed the greatest deference to Common Law Arbitration, often under the reason-
ing that the parties, themselves, had selected a dispute resolution proceeding that 
neither required nor allowed court oversight.72  State courts also exhibited great 
deference to Reference by Rule of the Court, with some assumption of judicial re-
view, seemingly based on the idea that the submission to arbitration had occurred 
only after the commencement of litigation and that the arbitration award would take 
the place of the judgment of the court.73  Last of all, state courts also showed great 
deference to Statutory Arbitration, often overtly distinguishing Statutory Arbitra-
tion from Common Law Arbitration, and then taking care to determine the outcome 
of the dispute according to the specific requirements of that state’s arbitration stat-
ute.74 
Yet, in spite of these commonalities, arbitration developed in distinct ways in 
early America.  State arbitration systems were influenced by, and often formalized 
in response to, the unique geographic, political, social, religious, or commercial 
conditions of the individual states.  While these states showed a great similarity in 
the arbitration procedures they adopted, largely mirroring English law and customs, 
they showed interesting distinctions both in arbitration practice and in arbitration 
policy, as articulated through legislation, court opinions, and public policy debates.  
Part B will explore these distinctions by looking to the historical development of 
arbitration in three very different states: Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. 
B.  State-Level Distinctions 
1.  Kentucky Claim-Stakers75 
The former Virginians who settled Kentucky territory in the mid- to late-1700s 
brought with them an understanding of English law and legal systems, including 
arbitration,76 but it was not until the occurrence of a statewide upheaval over land 
title disputes that Kentucky passed its version of the Locke statute in 1795.77 
                                                          
 70. See generally Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23 (providing a discussion of 
the variety of arbitration procedures that fell under the common term “arbitration”); Conklin, Lost Op-
tions, supra note 66 (same). 
 71. See generally Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23 (providing a discussion of 
state court decisions that combined terminology while parsing procedural differences). 
 72. Id. at 86; Smith v. Bos. & Me. R.R., 16 Gray 521, 523 (Mass. 1860). 
 73. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 86 (citing Sherron v. Wood, 10 N.J.L. 
16, 19 (N.J. Sup. Ct 1828)). 
 74. See Monosiet v. Post, 4 Mass. 532 (1808); Overly’s Executor v. Overly’s Devisees, 58 Ky. 117, 
119-22 (1858). 
 75. See Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 42-68 (providing a more complete 
discussion of Kentucky’s development as a territory and new American state, with an emphasis on the 
connection between Kentucky’s history and the development of arbitration in Kentucky). 
 76. Id. at 43, 45.  See supra Part III, English Arbitration: A Common Heritage.  See also CHARLES 
HUMPHREYS, COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 275-276 (1822) (for pres-
ence of the Common Law in early Kentucky). 
 77. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 48. 
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss1/7
No. 1] Arbitration in Early America 67 
Settlors moved to Kentucky territory in search of land, receiving land grants in 
exchange for military service, obtaining land rights through chartered land compa-
nies, or simply surveying and recording their land claims in the land office.78  As 
historian Richard Ellis states: 
Land was what Kentucky was all about.  It was in search of land that the 
speculator, the planter, and the farmer had dared to venture across the 
mountains in the first place.  And in no other state of the union was there 
as much confusion over land titles as in Kentucky. . . . As little was known 
about the geography of Kentucky, the locations of the various grants were 
only vaguely described.  Efforts made to survey the area merely compli-
cated the problem. . . . [O]ver a period of several years, the same terrain of 
land was often marked off several times, so that what might be designated 
as an individual lot by one surveyor would be included as different parts 
of several continuous lots by another.  As a result of these overlappings, 
the state became ‘shingled over’ with land claims to which two, three, and 
sometimes even four and five persons held conflicting titles.79 
As a result of this confusion, it was not uncommon for a settlor to stake claim 
to land that already was owned by an absentee landowner, who then could sue to 
eject the settlor.80  If the landowner won his ejectment suit, the result was devastat-
ing for the settlor; all improvements made by the settlor would stay with the land, 
becoming the absentee landowner’s property.81 
Virginia governed Kentucky territory prior to statehood.82  In an attempt to 
remedy the problem, Virginia enacted a statutory process for quieting title and cre-
ated a land commission to review and resolve conflicting land title claims.83  The 
statutory process proved too cumbersome to be effective and, although the commis-
sion resolved well over a thousand conflicting land title claims, thousands more 
remained.84  After Kentucky became a state in 1792, the uncertainty continued, in-
hibiting both settlement and agricultural development.85  Seemingly endless land 
title conflicts clogged Kentucky state court and federal court dockets, with nearly 
half of all private suits brought to federal courts in Kentucky from 1789-1816 cen-
tering on land title disputes.86 
Kentucky sought to achieve cheaper, speedier, and final results by granting the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over land title disputes, only to 
have the Court hand down a 1794 decision that called into question the land title 
cases previously resolved by the Virginia land commission.87  The Court’s decision                                                           
 78. Id. at 43-44. 
 79. Id. at 47 (quoting RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 139-142 (1971)). 
 80. Id. at 47. 
 81. Id. at 47, 53 n.95. 
 82. Id. at 45. 
 83. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 45. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 44-48. 
 86. Id. at 47 n.53. 
 87. This jurisdiction was granted upon statehood, in Article V, Section 3 of the Kentucky Constitution 
of 1792, with these stated policy goals: “to do right and justice to the parties, with as little delay and at 
as small an expense as the nature of the business will allow.” KENTUCKY-MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 
64, Article V, § 3.  See also Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 48. 
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created new insecurity and instability for landowners who had believed the Virginia 
land commission’s findings to be final.88  It also created a political firestorm, fueled 
by landowners’ fears that the Court had been influenced by land speculators and 
lawyers, both of whom stood to gain from conflicting land title claims.89  In re-
sponse, the legislature revoked the Court’s original jurisdiction over land title dis-
putes90 and, the next year, passed the 1795 Act Concerning Arbitrations.91  In 1799, 
Kentuckians included in their new state constitution a provision requiring the leg-
islature to pass further acts, as necessary, to support arbitration.92 
For Kentuckians overwhelmed by land title disputes and ready for a system of 
justice that would be not only cheap, speedy, and just, but also simple and final, 
arbitration was the answer.  Kentucky’s calls for a cheap, speedy, and just form of 
dispute resolution93 were included in the Preface to the 1795 Act Concerning Arbi-
trations, which stated that the Act was passed in response to the “enormous ex-
pences [sic]” and “tedious length of time” that caused lawsuits to be an “almost total 
denial of justice.”94 
In addition to common policy goals of savings in time and money and achiev-
ing justice, Kentucky landowners advocated for a government based on a “‘simple 
and concise code of laws.’”95   Arguments for simplicity were rooted in a strong 
anti-lawyer sentiment, with ongoing concerns that lawyers unnecessarily compli-
cated the law and then used those legal complications unjustly to gain title to land-
owners’ property.96  Concerns that the bar had done just that persisted and, in 1849, 
the Louisville Journal looked back on Kentucky’s history, stating that “the bar had 
‘despoiled’ the property of the State on behalf of ‘land-jobbers’; while themselves 
‘growing fat and sleek upon the miseries of the farmer’”97  Under the 1795 Arbitra-
tion Act, disputants were able to avoid the use of lawyers and unnecessary legal 
complications by using arbitrators of their own choosing and enjoying the benefits 
of court enforcement without first commencing litigation.98  In 1859, the Court 
made a strong policy statement in favor of simplicity as it opposed “technical and 
formal objections” to arbitration awards: “Mere formal objections to awards should 
be disregarded.  The settlement of controversies by arbitration is favored by law, 
and should be encouraged by sustaining awards, notwithstanding they may be liable 
                                                          
 88. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 48. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. KENTUCKY-MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 64, at Article VI, § 10 of KY. CONST. OF 1799. “It shall 
be the duty of the general assembly to pass such laws as may be necessary and proper to decide differ-
ences by arbitrators, to be appointed by the parties who may choose that summary mode of adjustment.” 
Id. 
 93. See Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 46 (quoting RICHARD E. ELLIS, 
THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 143, 147-48 (1969)) (dis-
cussing landowners’ and Radical Republicans’ efforts to establish a circuit court system). 
 94. WILLIAM LITTELL, STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY; WITH NOTES, PRAELECTIONS, AND 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE PUBLIC ACTS, 327-29 (1809). 
 95. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 46 (quoting RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE 
JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS, 125-26 (1969)). 
 96. Id. at 45. 
 97. Id. at 52 (quoting Louisville Journal, Oct. 26, 1849). 
 98. Id. at 49. 
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to technical and formal objections, which do not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties.”99 
As the case above highlights, Kentucky’s arbitration proponents argued not 
only for simplicity, but also for finality, a goal that seemed more achievable in ar-
bitration than in court, where land title judgments once more were subject to appeal.  
Kentucky’s land title problems continued throughout the nineteenth-century, with 
debates surrounding the call for a constitutional convention in 1849 including a 
proposal to grant quiet title to all claimants who had occupied the land for seven 
years.100  By the mid-1800s, hundreds of thousands of acres of land still had no 
owner recorded.101 
As stated in the 1795 Arbitration Act, the arbitration award was to “become a 
final end and [decision] of all and every controversy or suit to them so submitted . 
. . .”102  Indeed, throughout the antebellum period, Kentucky’s high court judges 
routinely upheld arbitration awards in the challenges that came before them,103 
whether the arbitration was by Common Law, or Statute,104 and with an emphasis 
on the finality Kentucky landholders desired.105  That finality extended even to 
cases where both parties wished to overturn the award, with the Court stating in 
1816, “The judgment is made as binding as if it were founded on the opinion of the 
court itself upon the merits of the claims.”106  To hold otherwise, as the Court argued 
in 1829, would be to make arbitration “more than useless; and settlements by parties 
themselves would be idle and unavailing.”107 
Kentucky’s highest court included a broad policy statement in favor of arbitra-
tion’s savings in time (through direct award enforcement) and money, its ability to 
achieve justice (“correct determination”), and its simplicity and finality in the 1858 
case of Overly’s Executor v. Overly’s Devisees: 
In modern times the submission of controversies to arbitration has been 
much more encouraged than it was anciently.  It has been the policy of the 
law to favor the settlement of disputes in this manner.  It is attended with 
much less expense than the ordinary litigation in courts of justice, and is 
just as likely to result in a correct determination of the matters in contro-
versy between the parties.  Acts have been passed by the legislature for its 
encouragement, by permitting the parties to proceed under an order of 
court, so that the award, when made, could be entered as the judgment of 
the court, instead of compelling the parties, as at common law, to resort to 
an action for a failure to perform it . . . .  A mere error of arbitrators, either 
as to law or fact, is no ground for setting aside their award.108    
                                                          
 99. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 64 (quoting Snyder v. Rouse, 58 Ky. 
625 (Ct. App. 1859)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 52-53. 
 102. Id. at 52-53 (quoting The Act Concerning Arbitrations, 1795 Ky. Acts, Ch. 9). 
 103. Id. at 54-59, 55 n.103. 
 104. Id. at 57-58. 
 105. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 55-56, 55 n.103, 64. 
 106. Id. at 56 (quoting Irvine’s Heirs v. Crockett, 7 Ky. 437, 438 (1816)). 
 107. Id. at 59 (quoting Callant v. Downey, 25 Ky. 346, 348 (1829)). 
 108. Overly’s Executor v. Overly’s Devisees, 58 Ky. 117, 120-22 (1858). 
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Did the availability of arbitration and policies that promoted arbitration for the 
cheap, speedy, just, simple, and final resolution of disputes make any difference in 
disputants’ selection of a dispute resolution mechanism?  The numbers seem to sug-
gest that they did in the area that Kentuckians fought over the most: land titles.  
Land title disputes comprised the largest known subject of dispute in arbitration 
cases brought before Kentucky’s highest court in the antebellum period.109 
2.  New Jersey Quakers110 
Like Kentucky, New Jersey recognized both Common Law Arbitration and 
Reference by Rule of Court in ways that reflected the English tradition.111  New 
Jersey passed its Locke statute, “An Act for [R]egulating References and [D]eter-
mining Controversies by Arbitration” soon after statehood—in 1794, just one year 
before Kentucky.112  Where New Jersey diverges from Kentucky is in the distinct 
policy goals articulated for the use of arbitration in the state.  Those goals were 
connected to New Jersey’s long history with Quaker practice, generally, and Quaker 
arbitration, in particular. 
New Jersey had a large Quaker population and arbitration shows up early on in 
New Jersey history, with Quaker Meetinghouse records detailing the practice of 
arbitration to resolve disputes in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centu-
ries.113  Records from the 1681 Yearly Meeting include an order “that if any differ-
ences do arise betwixt any two persons that profess Truth, that they do not go to law 
before they first lay it before the particular Monthly Meeting that they belong 
unto.”114  The 1719 Yearly Meeting records encouraged arbitration within the 
Quaker community even more clearly, stating that, in the event that parties could 
not resolve a dispute among themselves, “either the overseers or other discrete, ju-
dicious friends” were to “admonish and persuade the parties to choose referees or 
arbitrators.”115  Quakers were prompted to resolve disputes first “in our friendly 
way,” only going to court as needed to have the result “confirmed by a judgment.”116 
Quaker dispute resolution did not consist solely of arbitration but, instead, re-
flected a multi-layered dispute resolution process outlined in the Gospel of Mat-
thew: 
Moreover, if thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault 
between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou has gained thy brother.  But 
if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of 
two or three witnesses every word may be established.  And if he shall neglect to                                                           
 109. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 48. 
 110. See id. at 69-98 (providing a more complete discussion of the connections between New Jersey’s 
Quaker history and the development of arbitration in New Jersey). 
 111. Id. at 73, 81, 87-88 nn.295-96. 
 112. Id. at 81. 
 113. Id. at 71-73. 
 114. Id. at 74 (quoting EZRA MICHENER, A RETROSPECT OF EARLY QUAKERISM; BEING EXTRACTS 
FROM THE RECORDS OF PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING AND THE MEETINGS COMPOSING IT 266 
(1860)).  New Jersey Quakers attended the Burlington and Philadelphia Meetings.  This text comprises 
the records of both. 
 115. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 75 (quoting EZRA MICHENER, A 
RETROSPECT OF EARLY QUAKERISM; BEING EXTRACTS FROM THE RECORDS OF PHILADELPHIA YEARLY 
MEETING AND THE MEETINGS COMPOSING IT 270 (1860)). 
 116. Id. (quoting EZRA MICHENER, A RETROSPECT OF EARLY QUAKERISM; BEING EXTRACTS FROM 
THE RECORDS OF PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING AND THE MEETINGS COMPOSING IT 268 (1860)). 
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hear them, tell it unto the church: but if he neglect to hear the church, let him be 
unto thee as an heathen man and a publican.117 
The process began with negotiation (“go and tell him his fault between thee 
and him alone”).  If unsuccessful, negotiation would be followed by mediation 
(“take with the one or two more”).  If mediation did not succeed, the disputants 
were to bring their dispute before the Monthly Meeting (“tell it unto the church”) 
so that one or more members of the Quaker Meeting could be selected to arbitrate 
the dispute.118  If one or both parties refused to arbitrate, they would “be dealt with 
as one disorderly, and that regards not peace either in himself or in the Church, and 
that slights the love, order, and unity of the breathren.  And, after due admonition, 
if he or she persists therein, let such be disowned . . . .”119 
The Quaker community specifically encouraged disputants to follow these 
steps in the resolution of their disputes, with the stated goal of preserving or restor-
ing harmony and relationships, with such goals often tied to the welfare of the com-
munity.120  New Jersey Quakers took this process seriously, as evidenced by 
Monthly Meeting records, which include submissions to arbitration both before and 
after the commencement of litigation and, much more infrequently, the disowning 
of Quakers who refused to arbitrate.121 
Perhaps due to this Quaker influence, New Jersey enacted arbitration statutes 
early on.  The region that later would combine to become the state of New Jersey 
was first split into West and East sections.122  West Jersey passed the first arbitration 
statute in the colonies in 1682, requiring arbitration for disputes under a certain 
amount, and East Jersey passed an arbitration law in 1688.123  In 1794, New Jersey 
then enacted its version of the Locke statute, “An Act for [R]egulating References 
and [D]etermining Controversies by Arbitration.”124 
New Jersey’s promotion of arbitration in the antebellum period exhibited fa-
miliar policy goals of savings in time and money, justice, certainty or finality (so 
important to Kentuckians), and (as we will see in Massachusetts) the promotion of 
trade.125  But New Jersey also exhibited policy goals that were more particular to 
the Quaker backdrop of its arbitration development, namely an emphasis preserving 
or restoring harmony and community welfare and the right of disputants to choose 
arbitration for the resolution of their disputes. 
For example, in the 1791 case of Schooley v. Thorne, the Court upheld Com-
mon Law Arbitration, emphasizing both disputants’ right to choose arbitration and 
arbitration’s ability to help disputants to amicably resolve their differences: 
Every party clearly has a right to agree to submit his cause to other 
judges than those the law has appointed for him.  The utility of these am-
icable references has been perceived and encouraged by the legislature, 
                                                          
 117. Matthew 18:15-17 (King James). 
 118. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 75-76. 
 119. Id. at 76 (quoting EZRA MICHENER, A RETROSPECT OF EARLY QUAKERISM; BEING EXTRACTS 
FROM THE RECORDS OF PHILADELPHIA YEARLY MEETING AND THE MEETINGS COMPOSING IT 270 
(1860)). 
 120. Id. at 75-76; AUERBACH, supra note 18, at 30. 
 121. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 76-77. 
 122. Id. at 71. 
 123. Id. at 79. 
 124. Id. at 81. 
 125. Id. 
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but it is a common law right, which grew into notice under the encour-
agement of the courts.126 
As highlighted above, the New Jersey court viewed the judicial and legislative 
branches as the encouragers of this amicable method of dispute resolution, much as 
Quakers had encouraged individuals to resolve their disputes by “the friendly 
way.”127 
The Preface to New Jersey’s 1794 Arbitration Act evidenced similar goals, 
stating, “it hath been found by experience, that references made by rule of the court, 
have contributed much to the advancement of justice and the ease of the people.”128  
Ease was defined in 1755 as “quiet; rest; undisturbed tranquility; no solicitude [anx-
iety].”129  The Preface then highlighted the purposes of the Act: “to promote trade, 
to facilitate the means of accommodation, to expedite the determination of con-
troversies, and to render the awards of arbitrators the more effectual.”130 
The language “to facilitate the means of accommodation” is particularly inter-
esting given  Samuel Johnson’s 1755 definition of accommodation as: “composition 
of a difference, reconciliation, adjustment.”131  Both “composition of a difference” 
and “adjustment” are synonymous with “settlement.”132  But reconciliation means 
“renewal of friendship” and has a broader connotation of harmony and community 
welfare drawn from the Latin reconciliare: “to bring together again; regain; win 
over again, conciliate.”133 
                                                          
 126. Id. at 86 (quoting Schooley v. Thorne, 1 N.J.L. 83 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791)) (emphasis added). 
 127. See Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 
1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 123 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdiction-
aryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=123 (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (discussing amicable as synonymous 
with friendly). 
 128. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 81 (quoting An Act for [R]egulating 
References and [D]etermining Controversies by Arbitration, ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Dec. 2, 1794)). 
 129. See Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 
1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 670 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdiction-
aryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=670 (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (ease); Samuel Johnson, A 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL 
JOHNSON 1879 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=1879 (last 
modified Dec. 6, 2012) (solitude). 
 130. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 81 (quoting An Act for [R]egulating 
References and [D]etermining Controversies by Arbitration, ACTS OF THE NINETEENTH GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY (Dec. 2, 1794)). 
 131. Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 1755 
CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 1706 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdiction-
aryonline.com/?p=1706 (last modified Feb. 1, 2014). 
 132. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 1755 
CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 82 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/?p=13703 
(last modified May 22, 2014) (defining adjustment in definition #1 as “regulation; the act of putting in 
method; settlement”).   SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL 
EDITION OF THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 430 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdiction-
aryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=430 (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (defining composition in definition 
#8 as “compact; agreement; terms on which differences are settled”). 
 133. See Samuel Johnson, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF THE 
1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 1654 (Brandi Besalke Ed.), http://johnsonsdiction-
aryonline.com/?page_id=7070&i=1654 (last modified Dec. 6, 2012) (reconciliation).  ONLINE 
ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY (Douglas Harper, ed. 2016) http://www.etymonline.com/in-
dex.php?term=reconcile&allowed_in_frame=0 (last visited Mar. 26, 2016) (reconciliare under “recon-
cile”). 
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Perhaps the most prominent way in which the New Jersey courts continued to 
encourage this amicable method of dispute resolution throughout the antebellum 
period was by continually upholding the right of the disputants to agree to submit 
their dispute to arbitration instead of the courts of law.  As seen previously, the court 
in Schooley v. Thorne (1791) upheld the right of a disputant to “agree to submit his 
cause to other judges other than those the law has appointed for him.”134  The 1794 
Arbitration Act stated it was open to “all persons” who mutually agreed to submit 
their dispute to the court for arbitration.135  After the passage of the 1794 Act, the 
court went out of its way to reaffirm disputants’ choice of any one of the three 
different arbitration procedures now available to them—Common Law Arbitration, 
Reference by Rule of the Court, or Statutory Arbitration136—stating that the legis-
lature had not eliminated Common Law Arbitration when it created Statutory Arbi-
tration and emphasizing that disputants who wished to use Common Law Arbitra-
tion could not be compelled by the court to choose Statutory Arbitration, with its 
accompanying court oversight, instead.137 
The policy goals of preserving and protecting harmony and community welfare 
that were articulated by the New Jersey legislature and court are reflective of those 
same goals within the Quaker community.  The New Jersey courts and legislature 
also evidenced an overarching goal of keeping these amicable methods of dispute 
resolution available to all disputants, both in the policy language they incorporated 
into the 1794 Arbitration Act and in the cases that followed. 
3.  Massachusetts Merchants and Maritime Risk-Takers138 
Massachusetts law on arbitration developed within an economy marked by a 
strong merchant community.  Like Kentucky and New Jersey, Massachusetts rec-
ognized both Common Law Arbitration and Reference by Rule of Court from the 
English legal tradition.139  But Massachusetts passed its version of the Locke statute 
much earlier—in 1786—and in response to law and policy debates that, as in Ken-
tucky, were fueled by strong anti-lawyer sentiment.140 
Where Kentucky’s anti-lawyer sentiment was centered around ongoing land 
title disputes—and fears that lawyers would take “one half of your land to defend 
your right to the other”—anti-lawyer sentiment in Massachusetts centered on the 
state’s late-eighteenth century economic crisis141 and an early-statehood battle sur-
rounding the rise of the Massachusetts Bar and formalization of the legal profes-
sion.142  One of the most prominent opponents of the legal profession in eighteenth-
                                                          
 134. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 86 (quoting Schooley v. Thorne, 1 
N.J.L. 83, 87 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791)). 
 135. Id. at 81-82. 
 136. Id. at 85-88, 87-88 n.295, 88 n.296. 
 137. Id. at 86. 
 138. See Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 42-68 (providing a more complete discussion of 
policy debates surrounding arbitration in antebellum Massachusetts, with an emphasis on merchants). 
 139. See An Act to Impower [sic] Justices of the Peace to Summon Witnesses, 1734-1744 PROVINCE 
LAWS 132, http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/bitstream/handle/2452/118081/1743acts0024.txt?se-
quence=1&isAllowed=y (last visited Mar. 8, 2016) (summarizing Common Law Arbitration and Refer-
ence by Rule of the Court in colonial Massachusetts). 
 140. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 585-87. 
 141. Id. at 585-86. 
 142. Id. at 586-89. 
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century Massachusetts also was one of the most vocal proponents of arbitration: 
Benjamin Austin.143  According to Austin, 
[t]he ‘order’ of lawyers . . . So far from being a ‘necessary,’ are in most 
cases a useless body.  As the laws can be better executed without them; 
and as they are of late so rapidly increasing in all parts of the Common-
wealth, . . . it is become absolutely necessary, as we regard the welfare of 
the community, that the people direct their Representatives to lay before 
the Legislature, the present pernicious practice of this ‘order,’ that some 
measure may be adopted effectually to stop them in their dangerous pro-
gress.144 
The measure that Austin recommended in response to that threat, and the meas-
ure that the legislature enacted, was arbitration.145 
Massachusetts passed its Locke statute, “An Act for Rendering the Decision of 
Civil Causes, As Speedy, and As Little Expensive As Possible” (commonly known 
as The Referee Act) in 1786.146  The policy goals of saving time and money, also 
common to Kentucky and New Jersey, were expressed right in the title.  Massachu-
setts arbitration supporters also called for simplicity, consistency, and community 
welfare, with a theme of justice running throughout. 
Where Kentucky arbitration supporters argued for simplicity as a way to pro-
tect their land from the claims of “land-jobbers and lawyers,” Massachusetts arbi-
tration supporters argued for simplicity in opposition to the rise of the legal elite 
and a corresponding formalization of the law and legal system, which they believed 
would lead to unnecessary complexity and limitations on the layperson’s ability to 
resolve his own disputes.147  They argued for a simple system of justice, based on 
their belief that the common law easily could be known by layperson and lawyer, 
alike, and therefore easily could be applied to the resolution of disputes by layper-
son arbitrators in arbitration proceedings.148  They advocated for clear laws, which 
could be easily known and understood, and a simpler administration of justice that 
could be navigated by laypersons without the help of trained lawyers.149  Proposals 
to simplify and then codify the common law formed one prong of that proposal.150  
Proposals to almost entirely replace litigation with arbitration formed another.151 
Arbitration was hailed as promoting not only simplicity, but also the benefits 
of consistency in outcome, as it gave merchants, in particular, the ability to choose 
arbitrators who, unlike judges, were well-versed in commercial law.152  Arbitrators’                                                           
 143. Id. at 590. 
 144. Id. at 583 (quoting BENJAMIN AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE 
LAW AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 10-11 (Adams and Nourse 1786), 
microformed on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. I, no. 19481 (Am. Hist. Imprints)). 
 145. Id. at 590-92. 
 146. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 592.  An Act for Rendering the Decision of Civil Causes, 
as Speedy, and as Little Expensive as Possible, 1786 MASS ACTS 55-57, The State Library of Massa-
chusetts Electronic Repository, http://archives.lb.state.ma.us/actsResolves/1786/1786acts0021.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2016). 
 147. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 592, 599-600. 
 148. Id. at 601-02. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 591 n.53. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 624 n.268. 
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familiarity with commercial law may explain one of the most interesting aspects of 
arbitration in Massachusetts, which was the sophisticated use of arbitration to re-
solve insurance disputes, particularly those involving shipwrecks, which often in-
cluded arbitrators’ valuation of both the damaged ship and its cargo.153  Interestingly 
enough, arbitration’s opponents also tapped into the policy goals of consistency, 
arguing that that the rapidly-formalizing legal profession—with its trained lawyers 
and publication of judicial opinions—was better equipped than layperson arbitra-
tors to foster consistency in legal rulings and development of the law, especially 
commercial law.154 
In addition to simplicity and consistency, Massachusetts proponents of arbitra-
tion cited community welfare as a reason to support arbitration.  But where New 
Jersey’s promotion of community welfare reflected the Quaker goals of preserving 
and restoring harmony, Massachusetts arbitration supporters advocated specifically 
on behalf of those disputants who were denied justice because they were unable to 
afford the long delays of a complex legal system.155  They believed such disputants 
necessarily would be at a disadvantage if faced with litigation against a represented 
opponent, and they promoted arbitration as a way of removing this power imbalance 
in the resolution of disputes.156  Furthermore—and in keeping with his policy argu-
ments promoting the welfare of the community—Austin argued that if not for law-
yers seeking fees,”[t]he paltry litigious causes amongst neighbors would not exist: 
Harmony and benevolence would more generally prevail, and agreeable to my 
motto, ‘Mutual passions, mutual charms might lend, And each to each be neighbour, 
father, friend.’”157 
In 1786, Austin stated that the observations included in his pamphlet campaign 
“were solely intended for the public good.”158  As discussed above, those observa-
tions included a call to almost completely replace litigation with arbitration in order 
to promote cheaper and speedier access to justice, provide a simpler justice system 
that did not require legal representation, create consistency in rulings, and support 
community welfare.  Nearly 30 years after the passage of the arbitration statute, 
Massachusetts saw a reissue of Austin’s 1786 pamphlet campaign supporting arbi-
tration over litigation.159  The reissue contained some edits, including this preface 
at the beginning of the 1814 edition: 
 What solid Joy it is, for a virtuous man, in the practice of the law, to 
think he has received a talent from God which makes him the sanctuary of 
                                                          
 153. See Erick v. Johnson, 26 Mass. 193 (1810) (involving arbitration to resolve claims resulting from 
shipwrecks or other damage to ships and their cargo); Newburyport Marine Ins. Co. v. Oliver, 8 Mass. 
402 (1812) (same); Homes v. Avery, 12 Mass. 134 (1815) (same), Hall v. Franklin Ins. Co., 9 Pick 466 
(1830) (same), Richardson v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 3 Metcalf 573 (1842) (same), Cobb v. New England Mut. 
Marine Ins. Co., 6 Gray 192 (1856) (same). 
 154. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 602, 605-07. 
 155. Id. at 600, 624.  See generally AUERBACH, supra note 18, at 33 (highlighting the goal of commu-
nity welfare among the merchant community in colonial America). 
 156. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 602. 
 157. Id. at 600 (quoting BENJAMIN AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE 
LAW AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 19 (Adams and Nourse 1786), 
microformed on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. I, no. 19481 (Am. Hist. Imprints)). 
 158. Id. at 610 (quoting BENJAMIN AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE 
LAW AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 12 (Adams and Nourse 1786), 
microformed on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. I, no. 19481 (Am. Hist. Imprints)). 
 159. Id. at 610. 
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the unfortunate, the protector of justice, and enables him to defend the 
lives, fortunes, and honour of his countrymen. – Rollin160 
The opening quotation to the 1814 reissue of Austin’s pamphlet campaign re-
flects once more the theme of community welfare, but this time identifies the lawyer 
as promoting, not opposing, the common good.  In his prefatory comments, Austin 
went on to say, “the practice within the bar has become more congenial to the hap-
piness of the society.”161  What changed?  Massachusetts undertook substantial le-
gal reform, and self-regulation of the Bar, in the years following the passage of The 
Referee Act.162  Perhaps Austin believed, in 1814, that the policy goals that led him 
to advocate almost exclusively for arbitration in 1786—speed, affordability, access 
to justice, simplicity, consistency, and community welfare—now had been 
achieved. 
Part of that achievement may have been due to Massachusetts’ strong support 
of arbitration throughout the antebellum period.  In addition to the 1786 Referee 
Act, Massachusetts passed An Act for Rendering Law Less Expensive, which re-
quired justices of the peace to recommend arbitration to disputants who came before 
them.163  Massachusetts continued to uphold Common Law Arbitration, Statutory 
Arbitration, and Reference by Rule of the Court throughout the antebellum pe-
riod.164  In 1853, the court in Fairchild v. Adams considered the “nature and con-
clusiveness of awards,” coming out strongly in favor of arbitration: 
The tendency of modern jurisprudence is, to give force, conclusiveness, 
and effect to all awards, where there is no corruption or misconduct on the 
part of the referees, and where no deception has been practised upon them. 
Parties have a right, if they please, to refer all questions between them to 
arbitration; volunti non fit injuria, . . .  A decision of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, is merely a statement that such is the law of the land, and the 
presumption is, that where the law has once been so declared it will be 
again. That is the foundation of our system of precedents. But the parties 
have as good a right to say, that they will choose their own judges in their 
own case, as to resort to the regular tribunals, and it is presumed they will 
choose persons of competent capacity and sufficient legal skill. The con-
clusions of the arbitrators upon questions of law or of fact must stand upon 
the same grounds . . . .165 
V.  IMPLICATIONS FOR ARBITRATION LAW AND POLICY DEBATES 
This article began with an overview of the Third Circuit’s use of the history of 
arbitration in its application of “experience and logic test” as it considered the First                                                           
 160. Id. at 610-11 (quoting BENJAMIN AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE 
LAW AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 61 (Belcher, 1814), microformed 
on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. II, no. 30716, 43116, 31753 (Am. Hist. Imprints)). 
 161. Id. at 611 (quoting BENJAMIN AUSTIN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE PERNICIOUS PRACTICE OF THE 
LAW AS PUBLISHED OCCASIONALLY IN THE INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE 61 (Belcher, 1814), microformed 
on Early Am. Imprints, Ser. II, no. 30716, 43116, 31753 (Am. Hist. Imprints)). 
 162. Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 611-13. 
 163. Id. at 613-14. 
 164. Id. at 617-18. 
 165. Fairchild v. Adams, 65 Mass. 549, 550, 553 (1853). 
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Amendment open access question raised by the plaintiff in Delaware Coalition for 
Open Government v. Strine.  Unfortunately, and as the prior discussion demon-
strates, the Third Circuit utilized an incomplete history of arbitration under the “ex-
perience” prong and that history then informed the Court’s decision-making under 
the “logic” prong.  What remains unclear is what the Court might have decided 
under the “logic” prong if its prior reasoning in the “experience” prong had been 
based on a more complete and nuanced understanding of arbitration procedure, 
practice, and policy across American history.  A closer look at the history of arbi-
tration, as it existed first in eighteenth-century England, and then in antebellum 
Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, raises several themes that would be im-
portant to remember should questions about the history of arbitration arise again. 
First, the term “arbitration” in early America described not a single arbitration 
procedure, but three different arbitration procedures, each of which had its roots in 
the English legal tradition and each of which disputants could utilize for the resolu-
tion of their dispute.  Those three procedures differed in ways that matter for how 
we think about arbitration today.  Common Law Arbitration took place wholly apart 
from litigation while Reference by Rule of the Court was available only after liti-
gation had commenced.  Statutory Arbitration sought to meld the best aspects of 
these two systems and did it well; Kentucky, New Jersey, and Massachusetts each 
passed an arbitration statute in the eighteenth-century that, although expanded and 
modified, informed statutory arbitration procedure and practice throughout the an-
tebellum period.166 
Second, state-level arbitration statutes not only outlined procedures for arbitra-
tion under the statute, but also encouraged its use through provisions that were 
drawn from, and in some cases reliant upon, the courts.  As discussed above, such 
provisions included fee schedules for arbitration that mirrored those of civil litiga-
tion, acknowledging the arbitrator(s) power to subpoena witnesses, and court en-
forcement of the arbitration award as a judgment of law. 
Third, while there are a great many commonalities within the arbitration pro-
cedures of these three states, the policy reasons that led to the adoption of those 
procedures differed quite a lot.  Kentuckians were motivated to find a cheap, speedy, 
just, simple, and final way to resolve their land title disputes.167  New Jersey arbi-
tration was influenced by over a century of arbitration theory and practice within 
the New Jersey Quaker community.168  Thus, New Jersey arbitration supporters fo-
cused on arbitration’s affordability, efficiency, and ability to achieve just and final 
results, while also highlighting the very Quaker arbitration goals of building har-
mony and preserving community welfare.169  Massachusetts passed its arbitration 
statute in the midst of political debates marked by strong anti-lawyer sentiment and 
coupled its calls for efficiency and affordability with calls for simplicity, con-
sistency, and community welfare.170  The Massachusetts merchant community—
longstanding users of arbitration to settle their disputes— were split on the policy 
                                                          
 166. Conklin, Transformed, Not Transcended, supra note 23, at 68, 95-96 (Kentucky and New Jersey); 
Conklin, Lost Options, supra note 66, at 628 (Massachusetts). 
 167. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 168. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 169. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
 170. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
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debates, with goals of consistency and uniformity drawing some merchants to arbi-
tration and others to the rising legal profession.171  Massachusetts also saw the use 
of arbitration in the maritime insurance industry.172 
Fourth, the policy reasons that drove the adoption of arbitration statutes also 
were reflected in arbitration practice and in judicial opinions upholding arbitration 
awards.  Land title disputes not only led to the passage of Kentucky’s first arbitra-
tion statute, but also formed the largest known subject of dispute in arbitration cases 
that made their way to the state’s highest court in the antebellum period.  New Jer-
sey was influenced by Quaker goals of harmony and community welfare, and New 
Jersey’s highest court judges identified harmony and community welfare among 
their reasons for supporting and upholding arbitration throughout the antebellum 
period.173  The Massachusetts fight over laypersons and lawyers in the legal profes-
sion led to a public policy promotion of arbitration in place of litigation, but the end 
result of that policy battle was a reformed dispute resolution system that included 
both litigation and arbitration, combining some of the best attributes of both, as 
exemplified within the merchant community and maritime insurance industries. 
Fifth, a close look at arbitration history reveals that many of our modern-day 
debates about arbitration are simply old questions in a new setting.  Whether we are 
questioning the role of disputants’ consent to submit their dispute to arbitration, 
connections between arbitration and the courts, the role of “experts,” durability and 
finality of the award, standards of appeal, court deference to arbitration awards, the 
use of religious arbitration, the role of evidence, access to justice, or the efficiency, 
affordability, or efficacy of the arbitration proceeding, we do so knowing that these 
questions, and the policy struggles that engender them, have a long place in our 
nation’s history.  While we would not expect or desire even the most careful histor-
ical research to prescribe our answers to the very serious law and policy questions 
that underlie the debates surrounding arbitration’s current “hot topics,” we may find 
that a more complete view of arbitration in American history could stimulate, clar-
ify, and better inform our analysis as we, today, consider these questions anew. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen a resurgence in the passage of state-level statutory ar-
bitration systems—like the system at issue in Delaware Coalition for Open Gov-
ernment v. Strine.  While these systems appear to be innovative departures from the 
1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), they often share many of the characteristics 
of arbitration as it had been practiced, in a variety of forms, at the state level from 
the 1700s forward.  If we want to fully understand the nature of arbitration across 
American history—and the experience prong of the open access test requires that 
we do—we ought to look beyond the more recent form of arbitration that has been 
practiced under the FAA and gain a clearer understanding of the diversity of arbi-
tration practices and procedures that have existed across American history. 
While a closer look at the history of arbitration might not immediately validate 
any given state’s statutory arbitration scheme—and, for both law and policy rea-
sons, we may not want it to—a closer look could at least ensure that the history 
                                                          
 171. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
 172. See supra Part IV.B.3; supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
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relied upon in assessing the constitutionality of any such scheme would be accurate.  
Such accuracy is vital to avoiding not only misconceptions about the nature of ar-
bitration in American history, but also the potential negative ramifications such mis-
conceptions might hold for the future existence and stability of a variety of arbitra-
tion models for parties to choose from in resolving their disputes. 
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